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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 209 
Accident time: 11:15 Accident Date: 15/03/1999 
Where it occurred: Grad, Orasca, Una 
Santon Canton 
Country: Bosnia Herzegovina 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Survey accident Date of main report: 17/03/1999 
ID original source: WL/RB/HG/JH Name of source: BiH MAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: dry/dusty 
grass/grazing area 
sparse trees 
Date record created: 15/02/2004 Date  last modified: 15/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR: WK 840 427 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: WGS 84 Kulen Vakuf Map series: M709 
Map edition: 9 DMA Map sheet: 2384 II 
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
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Accident report 
A Board of Inquiry report was ordered by the country MAC and carried out by representatives 
of the regional MACs and ex-pat Technical Advisors. The report was made available along 
with a "Lessons Learned document from the MAC, and the following summarises their 
content. 
The accident involved a "two man Community Liaison Team [CLT] who were collecting 
information about a suspect area of ground as part of a follow up to a request from" the local 
community. It seems likely that the team members were drawn from a local commercial 
demining company and their activity funded by an international NGO. 
In this case, the CLT had received information that an area near the village of Orsaca was 
believed by local people to be mined. A visit to the area was scheduled as part of the CLT's 
weekly plan of work. The workplan was approved and the visit accepted as an appropriate 
part of the team's activities. 
 
[The picture above was taken during the acident investigation.] 
The area where the accident occurred "was described as rough hillside and pastureland" with 
a sparse covering of small trees and bushes. The grass had been close cropped by grazing 
animals "and by the activities of the local population".  A photograph showed cropped grass 
and scrubby bush. The ground was dry. The detonation occurred about 15m from an 
unsurfaced track and about 2 km from the nearest tarred road. There were lines of defensive 
trenches near the area, the closest being 30m from the accident site. A previous demining 
operation had cleared 13,000 square metres in the area in 1997 on the opposite side of the 
track about 100m from the accident site. A mortar and two PMA-2s were found during this 
clearance. 
A mine accident occurred in 1996 about 200m North of the accident when an IFOR vehicle 
detonated an AP mine without injury.  
This task was part of routine "community Liaison" - it had not been set a demining priority. 
The work of the CLT teams was monitored on an occasional basis. 
Community Liaison Teams (CLTs) were issued a portable phone in "areas where there is an 
operational requirement and when a mobile telephone is available". The team in this accident 
did not have one. 
The team arrived in the area at 10:45. The man supposed to guide them did not arrive, but 
another person substituted. They drove along an unsurfaced track, then parked and walked 
on until they could see the remaining minefield marking of a previously cleared area on the 
other side of the track. They had walked about 15m off the track towards the suspect area 
before the victim (who was the Team Leader and third in line) stepped on a mine. 
"The team was collecting information by talking to the local community and by visiting areas 
of suspect ground as part of a process of assessment to decide whether the area warranted 
the deployment of mine clearance teams. Mines had been found on adjacent areas. The team 
considered that the ground where the detonation occurred was an area with no obvious risk 
because it was in use by the local community. The team had no information that there were 
any mines on that side of the track. The team were not using demining tools or equipment 
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and was not deployed on demining operations. Injuries sustained by one person led to the 
amputation of his right foot."  This occurred at 11:15 [or 11:25, conflict in documents]. 
After the detonation the victim was helped to the nearest track by his partner and the local 
guide. The partner "stemmed bleeding from the wound by using [the victim's] bootlace as a 
tourniquet around his lower leg". The team did not carry medical equipment and were not 
trained as medics. Their car had a first aid kit but no trauma kit. The victim was received into 
Bihac hospital at about 12:15 hours. 
Both team members were experienced in "mine action activities" and trained in first aid. 
Neither had been trained as a deminer, surveyor or medic. The other team member gave first 
aid and drove the victim to Bihac hospital - "about 30 minutes drive from the scene". The 
casualty was conscious throughout. The vehicle they used was a HI Peugeot 205 with a VHF 
radio. The radio was used "immediately after the incident" to contact HQ . "The casualty 
received treatment in Bihac hospital. His injuries resulted in the amputation of his right foot, 
above the ankle, but below the knee." 
The "mine involved was probably an anti-personnel blast mine" (investigators were unable to 
confirm the mine type because of snow on the ground. No other mines were found between 
the track and the crater (in a subsequent clearance that was unfinished when the report was 
compiled). 
The victim was wearing "lightweight hiking boots". Describing his right boot, a document 
states that "the sole and a large part of the boot's upper was damaged and torn away". 
 
Conclusions 
The investigation concluded that although the CLT was employed as part of a mines 
awareness programme, on the day of the accident they were carrying out what amounted to a 
"Level 1 survey". They had assessed the ground on which they walked as "being of no 
obvious risk". They found that neither member of the team had been "formally trained" to 
"carry out survey tasks" and they were "not properly equipped", although they were 
experienced. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that a clear distinction should be "made between Minefield 
Survey operations and community liaison as part of Mine Awareness activity. They 
recommended that personnel carrying out Level One Survey operations should report to an 
appropriate office, and that Mine Awareness Co-ordination should not task or co-ordinate 
Survey operations so that Teams would be deployed on Level 1 Survey as part of a planned 
"tasking for Survey Operations".  They continued, "In order to conduct Level One minefield 
Surveys and to be able to properly carry out the tasks stated in their job description, 
personnel should be trained and equipped accordingly." 
"…to ensure that all known information is made available to Survey teams, Minefield Surveys 
should be co-ordinated in co-operation with the MAC and any other organisation that may 
have information about mines in the area." Reliance should not be placed on a single source 
of unconfirmed information. 
The country "MAC should write a minimum training and qualification standard for personnel 
involved in Level 1 Surveys. This standard should be incorporated into MAC SOP No 1 - 
training, and be made available to the demining community. When teams are deployed to 
carry out Level 1 Surveys, it should be as part of a planned tasking for Survey Operations." 
Personnel deployed to carry out Level 1 Surveys should then work in accordance with the 
country MAC's relevant SOP or with their own accredited SOPs. Personnel deployed on Level 
1 Survey operations should not walk off known clear areas. 
Personnel should be trained and equipped appropriately to carry out the tasks stated in their 
job description [in this case including Survey - as indicated in a CLT Job Description on file]. 
The investigators added that personnel deployed on Level 1 Survey operations, or on 
minefield reconnaissance or related or similar operations should wear blast resistant boots." 
3 
 Victim Report 
Victim number: 269 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: surveyor  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Face 
minor Head 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A brief medical report was in the Accident file. The following summarises its content.  
The victim received "extensive bone and tissue injury to his right foot. During treatment… it 
was decided to amputate his foot approximately 15cm below the knee". The victim injured his 
"face and forehead" when he fell over onto a rock after the mine detonated under him.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the victims were sent to do a job without appropriate equipment and without adequate 
training. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training” because the work of Survey 
Level 1 was a part of their job description for which they were not appropriately prepared. 
The investigators’ recommendation to supply blast boots was “premature”. Trials of blast 
boots in the USA during 1999 (reported in 2000) found that there was little advantage in 
wearing any of the currently available boots when stepping on a charge the size of that in a 
PMA-3 and no advantage with a charge the size of that in a PMA-2. All of the boots limit 
mobility over rough or overgrown ground (some worse than others) and could make the 
wearer clumsy. Assessing the balance between the PMA-2 and PMA-3 risk in this theatre is 
especially difficult because a similar number of accidents have occurred with both mines.   
 
Related papers 
Other documents in the Accident file included a letter saying that all recommendations have 
been implemented and that "Blast boots have been ordered". 
A letter from to the group's French HQ reported that the victim stood on an AP while 
"collecting information from a member of the community who was taking them to an area 
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which was possibly mined". Following the incident, the HQ offered psychological counselling 
facilities for any of the group "members who wished to have it".  
Also in the Accident file was a sketch map of the site and a detailed map of the area, 
photographs of the general area (showing close grass and scrubby bush) a photograph of the 
kind of boot worn (a thick soled hiking boot with part canvas upper), a job description 
including a requirement to conduct  "Level 1 Surveys", statements of witnesses (not 
translated), and a report of the previous clearance in the area.   
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